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Abstract
The paper develops a logical understanding of processes for signature of le-
gal contracts, motivated by applications to legal recognition of smart contracts
on blockchain platforms. A number of axioms and rules of inference are devel-
oped that can be used to justify a “meeting of the minds” precondition for contract
formation from the fact that certain content has been signed. In addition to an
“offer and acceptance” process, the paper considers “signature in counterparts”, a
legal process that permits a contract between two or more parties to be brought
into force by having the parties independently (possibly, remotely) sign different
copies of the contract, rather than placing their signatures on a common copy at
a physical meeting. It is argued that a satisfactory account of signature in coun-
terparts benefits from a logic with syntactic self-reference. The axioms used are
supported by a formal semantics, and a number of further properties of the logic
are investigated. In particular, it is shown that the logic implies that when a con-
tract has been signed, the parties do not just agree, but are in mutual agreement (a
common-knowledge-like notion) about the terms of the contract.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are a form of code, in the context of cryptocurrency and blockchain
platforms, that is used to enforce security properties of multi-agent protocols. Often
these protocols are for processes for which trust amongst the agents would typically
have been provided through the use of legal contracts, and many of the applications
under consideration, including financial derivatives, tokens representing corporate eq-
uity rights, insurance, and loans, are plainly within the scope of contract law. The
emergence of the area of smart contracts has therefore given renewed motivation to
study the formal representation of legal reasoning and legal processes.
A long term goal for research in this area is to develop a level of abstraction, inter-
mediate between natural language contracts and smart contract code, that enables the
content of a contract to be expressed in logical form. Representations at this level of
abstraction would help to bridge between the declarative form of legal contracts and
the imperative form of smart contract code, and provide a formal specification against
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which the code can be verified. In the present paper, we consider questions of logical
representation pertinent to a particular legal process: contract signature.
Depending on the legal jurisdiction, various criteria are applied in law in order to
determine whether a contract has been validly formed between two or more parties.
For example, Anglo-American law, or Common law, applies criteria including “meet-
ing of minds” (which may be witnessed by “offer and acceptance”), “consideration”
(exchange of value), “intention to create legal relations”, and “capacity” (being of req-
uisite age and of sound mind, or holding a corporate position delegated to enter into
contracts on a company’s behalf). For some specific types of transactions, e.g., sale
of land, signed documentation is mandatory, but in general, a signed agreement is not
required for a contract to be established. However, the formality of signed documen-
tation is very frequently used to help establish the evidentiary basis for formation of
a contract. Our concern in this paper is specifically with the signature process, rather
than with the complete set of legal criteria for formation of a contract.
In formation of legal contracts using signed agreements, all parties to the contract
are required to sign in order for the contract to be considered valid. Frequently, this is
done at a physical meeting of the parties so that copies of the contract can be signed
and immediately exchanged for co-signature. There are several motivations for this
process. For one, it enables the parties signing to be authenticated, and allows for wit-
nessing of the signatures. It is also frequently desirable to establish a state of common
knowledge amongst the parties that the contract has been signed and that the signers
were authenticated: a physical signing ceremony achieves this goal. Finally, it pre-
vents one party gaining advantage by presentation of a partially signed contract to a
third party (e.g., Bob induces Carol to offer a higher price on Bob’s house by showing
her the sales contract that Alice has signed).
However, physical meetings present the difficulties of scheduling of the participants
and travel costs. In practice, therefore, the parties frequently allow the contract to be
considered valid when each of the parties has signed a distinct copy. This is referred
to as the document being signed “in counterparts”, and is considered legally valid in
many jurisdictions. In some cases there is the additional requirement that the contract
is not valid until the signed copies have been delivered to the parties.
The question we address in this paper is the following: when a party signs their
copy of a contract, just what, logically, is the attitude that they are taking in doing so?
They are generally not assenting that they are bound by the terms φ of the contract,
since that depends on the other party or parties to the contract also signing. A better
characterization would seem to be the conditional assertion “I assent to be bound by
the terms φ provided that the others do also”.
To formalize this intuition, we work in the setting of a modal logic in the spirit
of logics of access control and authentication [Aba08], which have been applied to
formal reasoning about cryptographic protocols, digital certificate infrastructures and
access control policies. In particular, we use a modality A J φ to capture that an
agent A “assents to” a formula φ. In the computer security literature, the corresponding
modality is usually glossed as capturing what agent A “says”. We prefer the readings
“assents to” or ”agrees that”, since in our application of contract signature, the formula
φ will express the terms of a contract, and what an agent says may have implications
for their legal commitments, so has a more formal connotation. Since our development
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requires a distinction between this modality and the syntactic form of content explicitly
signed by an agent, the logic uses additional constructs A sig t (agent A has signed
syntactic content t) and t ֌ φ (syntactic content t entails, or includes in its meaning,
formula φ). The construct t ֌ φ is used to bridge between syntactic content signed
and what an agent assents to.
We take it to be a key criterion for formation of a contract, expressed in the formula
φ, between two parties A and B, that both parties agree to the terms φ, which we can
express in the logic as (A J φ)∧(B J φ). This could be understood as corresponding to
the legal notion of a ‘meeting of the minds’ of the parties. In highly formalized settings
such as smart contracts on a blockchain under a “Code is Law” interpretation, this
condition may be taken to be necessary and sufficient for formation of an enforceable
contract. However, as noted above, the law takes a significantly more nuanced view
that applies additional, jurisdiction dependent, criteria. To allow for interpretations in
which this condition is used merely as a necessary condition for contract formation,
we therefore do not interpret the construct A J φ as carrying normative meaning.
The intuitive reading of A J φ is therefore weaker than normative notions such as
“commitment”, “obligation” and “promise” that have been the focus of work in deontic
logic and multi-agent systems. In our intended application, such normative content
would be expressed in the formula φ itself, though we do not attempt to develop the
expressiveness required for this in the logic of the present paper.
We show that the logic can explain a meeting of the minds in an offer and accep-
tance process for contract formation by having the offeror sign a message that states
essentially the conditional “I assent to be bound by the terms φ provided that you sign
φ”, to which the acceptor responds by signing φ. However, the content signed in this
process is asymmetric. We show that a naive way to capture signature in counterparts,
in which the parties sign symmetric conditional statements, does not suffice to establish
a meeting of the minds. We argue that a better understanding can be obtained by treat-
ing the contract as making a self-referential statement: “This contractmay be signed in
counterparts”, that one does indeed find in the natural language text of many actual con-
tracts. The problem that then arises is how to make formal sense of such self-reference,
given that attempts to introduce self-reference into logic are fraught with paradox. We
solve this problem by developing a logical treatment that allows self-reference without
falling into inconsistency.
Key to our approach to handling self-reference without paradox is the distinction
between syntactic terms and their logical entailments. In addition to naturally fitting the
underlying cryptography, this enables our semantics of self-reference to avoid complex
constructions using three-valued logic, fixed points or nonstandard set theories.
We give a number of axioms and a model theoretic semantics that validates these
axioms. We then show that the axioms allow a formal account of the reasoning by
which a contract signed in counterparts becomes valid. We go on to study some further
properties of the logic. Our logic uses an axiom, similar to others in the literature, that
states essentially that if an agent has signed a message t, then all agents assent to the
fact that it has signed this message. We show that it follows that our account of contract
signature implies not just that the parties jointly assent to the terms of the contract, but
that they mutually assent, a stronger common-knowledge like property. Indeed, we
show that not just the agents, but society itself mutually assents to the fact that the
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agents mutually assent. This is a much stronger conclusion, that may be questionable
in the context of asynchronous or unreliable communication. However, we argue that
the conclusion is justifiable under some interpretations of the logic that involve use of
trusted third parties or a blockchain to register the signatures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the syntax of a logic
dealing with signed messages, their semantics, and the consequences for what an agent
assents to. We give this logic a model theoretic semantics in Section 3. In Section 4,
we show that the logic can be used to give an account of an offer and acceptance pro-
cess for contract signature. Section 5 turns to the topic of signature in counterparts.
An abstract account of how the individual signatures of the parties leads to their joint
assent to the terms of the contract is provided. However, this account relies upon an
unexplained assumption about the meaning of the contract. To justify this assumption,
we then turn in Section 6 to extending the syntax and semantics of the logic to include
self-referential formulas. We show that this can be achieved without falling into con-
tradiction. Section 7 returns to signature in counterparts, showing that the previously
unexplained assumption can be justified by taking the contract to be self-referential.
Section 8 deals with the issue of mutual assent to the contract. Finally, Section 9 con-
cludes with a discussion of related work and possible future directions.
2 A Logic
The logic can be understood as describing a static situation, in which it has been deter-
mined which messages have been signed, and all these signed messages are available
to all agents. We would like to determine what each agent will be understood to have
formally agreed to in such a situation. The reader may find it helpful to think of the
logic as describing a situation in which all the relevant information about what has been
signed has been presented in court. (Other interpretations of the logic are discussed in
Section 8.)
The syntax of the logic is parameterized by a tuple Σ = (A,Prop,O) whereA,Prop
are disjoint sets and O = (O0,O1, . . .) is a sequence of sets On, also disjoint. Intuitively,
A is a set of atomic terms representing agents, with generic elements A, B, . . .. The set
Prop is a set of atomic terms, representing atomic propositions, with generic elements
p, q . . . The set On for n ∈ N contains operator names, understood to have arity n. A
generic element of On is written on to indicate that operator o has arity n. Given Σ, we
define a set of terms T , with generic element t and a set of formulas F , with generic
element φ, ψ, . . .. Formally, terms and formulas are specified by
t ::= A | on(t1, . . . , tn) | φ
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | t֌ φ | A sig t | A J φ
where n ≥ 0 and on is any operator in On. Note that F ⊂ T , so every formula is
also a term. Intuitively, terms not in F represent application specific content that is not
purely logical, but may still be signed and may contain formulas as subterms. Boolean
constructs other than the two included, such as φ1 ⇒ φ2 and φ1 ∨ φ2, can be treated as
abbreviations for formulas in the language in the usual way.
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Atomic propositions p are intended to represent assertions such as “Alice has the
obligation to pay Bob 30 Ethers by Dec 7, 2021.” We envisage extensions of the
logic tailored to representation of the content of contracts, and that this will involve
a richer base logic of formulas, including quantifiers, action expressions and temporal
and deontic operators. Since the present paper is concerned primarily with the signature
process, this richer expressiveness has been abstracted to the set of atomic propositions.
Intuitively, t֌ φ expresses that term t “entails” formula φ. In general, terms may
represent both logical and non-logical content. For example, a term representing a con-
tract may contain non-logical information such as a date of creation, the names of the
parties, as well as logical content in the form of clauses that capture the consequences
of the contract. The latter could correspond to formulas φ such that t ֌ φ. The pre-
cise semantics of t ֌ φ will be application specific. One application might include
using t to represent the (controlled) natural language text of a legal contract, and φ to
represent its content in logical form as a specification of a smart contract. Alternately,
t might express a standard Electronic Data Interchange message in the form of a set of
attribute-value pairs, and φ its intended logical semantics.
The formula A sig t expresses that agent A has “signed” term t. Intuitively, this
means that A has applied one of their private signature keys to (a serialisation of) the
term t, and that other parties who know the corresponding public verification key is
associated to A can verify that the signature is valid. Authentication of A here might
be simply because identity A is semantically represented as identical to the public key,
or because the association of A to the public verification key is attested by a trusted
certification authority. In the present paper, the logic abstracts from such details. Note
that we permit an arbitrary term to be signed, not just a formula.
Finally, A J φ expresses that agent A “assents to” or “agrees to” formula φ. In-
tuitively, this means that A agrees to φ and its logical consequences. Typically, this
will be because there exists evidence in the form of (cryptographically) signed content,
using which, such agreement can be proved. In particular, if A has signed a message
that means (entails) φ, it will follow that A agrees to φ. However, A will also have
to agree to facts that cannot reasonably be disputed, such as facts about what content
other agents have signed. As noted above, the logic can be understood as dealing with
a situation in which all signed content is available to all agents. We discuss possible
interpretations of this operator at greater length in Section 8.
The logic has the following axiom schemas and rules of inference. In the following,
φ, ψ are formulas, t is a term and A, B are agents. We write ⊢ φ to mean that φ is
derivable from axioms using the rules of inference given.
Axioms:
Ax1 All substitution instances of tautologies of propositional logic
Ax2 φ֌ φ
Ax3 ((t֌ φ) ∧ (t֌ (φ⇒ ψ)))⇒ (t֌ ψ)
Ax4 ((A sig t) ∧ (t֌ φ))⇒ A J φ
Ax5 (A J φ) ∧ (A J (φ⇒ ψ))⇒ A J ψ
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Ax6 (B sig t) ⇒ A J (B sig t)
Ax7 (t֌ φ)⇒ A J (t֌ φ)
Rules of Inference:
R1 ⊢ φ and ⊢ φ⇒ ψ implies ⊢ ψ.
R2 ⊢ φ implies ⊢ t֌ φ.
R3 ⊢ φ implies ⊢ A J φ.
Note that axiom Ax3 and rule R2 together state that “t ֌” is a normal modal
operator for each term t. Similarly axiom Ax5 and rule R3 together state that “A J”
is a normal modal operator for each agent A. Axiom Ax2 says that a formula (as a
term) entails itself. (Entailments of non-formula terms are application specific and are
not constrained by the logic.) Axiom Ax4 says that if agent A has signed t then they
assent to all entailments of term t. Axiom Ax6 can be understood as stating that signed
messages are indisputable, in the sense that if agent B has signed t then agent A must
agree that B signed t — agent A is unable to deny that the signature exists. Finally,
Axiom Ax7 states that agent agents assent to all facts about entailment; intuitively, this
captures that all agents are in agreement about the meaning of terms.
3 Semantics
The logic can be given a Kripke style semantics as follows. Given the parameters
Σ = (A,Prop,O) where A is the set of agent names, Prop is the (disjoint) subset of
atomic propositions, and O is the ranked set of operators, the language is defined by
a set of terms T , and a set of formula F . A model for the language based in these
parameters is a tuple 〈W,Rsig,R֌,RJ, pi〉, where the components and their intuitive
interpretations are as follows:
• W is a set, whose elements are called worlds,
• Rsig ⊆ W × A × T is a relation, such that (w, A, t) ∈ Rsig represents that in world
w, agent A has signed term t,
• R֌ ⊆ T × W is a relation, such that (t,w) ∈ R֌ represents that world w is
consistent with all the information entailed by term t,
• RJ ⊆ W ×A×W is a relation, such that (w, A,w
′) ∈ RJ represents that world w
′
is consistent with all that agent A assents to in world w,
• pi : W → P(Prop) is an interpretation that associates each world with the set of
atomic propositions holding at the world.
Note that the relation R֌ is not relativized to a world. Intuitively, the meaning of terms
is independent of the state of the world, and is “common knowledge” to all agents, who
all “speak the same language”. We do not assume that, for a fixed world w, the set of
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w′ for which (w, A,w′) ∈ RJ is non-empty. Intuitively, we allow that an agent assents
to an inconsistency, in which case no worlds are consistent.
The semantics of the logic is given by a relation of satisfaction M,w |= φ, where M
is a model, w is a world of M and φ is a formula. This relation is defined recursively by
• M,w |= p, for p ∈ Prop, when p ∈ pi(w),
• M,w |= ¬φ if not M,w |= φ,
• M,w |= φ1 ∧ φ2 if M,w |= φ1 and M,w |= φ2,
• M,w |= A sig t if (w, A, t) ∈ Rsig,
• M,w |= t֌ φ if M,w′ |= φ for all w′ ∈ W such that (t,w′) ∈ R֌,
• M,w |= A J φ if M,w′ |= φ for all w′ ∈ W such that (w, A,w′) ∈ RJ.
A formula φ is valid in a model M, written M |= φ, if M,w |= φ for all worlds w
of M. A rule of inference is valid in a model M if, for all worlds w of M, if M,w |= α
for all formulas α in the antecedant of the rule, then M,w |= β for the formula β in the
consequent.
In order to obtain models validating the axioms, we assume that a number of se-
mantic constraints hold:
SC1. For formulas φ, we have (φ,w) ∈ R֌ implies M,w |= φ.
SC2. If (w, A, t) ∈ Rsig then (w, A,w
′) ∈ RJ implies (t,w
′) ∈ R֌.
SC3. If (w, B, t) ∈ Rsig and (w, A,w
′) ∈ RJ then (w
′, B, t) ∈ Rsig.
Intuitively, SC1 says that a term that is also a formula entails that formula itself: ev-
ery world consistent with what is entailed must satisfy the formula. SC2 expresses
axiom Ax4 semantically: it says that if agent A has signed t then they assent to the
entailments of term t, in the sense that any world w consistent with what A assents to
must be consistent with these entailments. SC3 expresses Axiom Ax6 semantically. It
says that if B has signed t in world w, then B has also signed t in any world w′ that is
consistent with what A says in world w.
Proposition 1. The axiom schemas Ax1-Ax7 and rules of inference R1-R3 are valid
in models satisfying SC1-SC3.
Proof. Axiom Ax1 and rule R1 are immediate from the fact that the boolean operators
in formulas have their usual semantics. Axiom Ax2 is direct from SC1. Axioms Ax3,
Ax5 and rules R2 and R3 follow in the usual way from the fact that the operators t֌ φ
and A J φ have been given a standard Kripke semantics using relations R֌ and RJ.
Axiom Ax4 follows from SC2. For, suppose M,w |= (A sig t) ∧ (t ֌ φ). From
M,w |= (A sig t) we have that (w, A, t) ∈ Rsig. Let w
′ ∈ W be any world such that
(w, A,w′) ∈ RJ. By SC2, we have (t,w
′) ∈ R֌. Thus, from M,w |= (t ֌ φ), we
get M,w′ |= φ. We have shown that for all w′ ∈ W with (w, A,w′) ∈ RJ, we have
M,w′ |= φ. Thus, M,w |= A J φ.
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For axiom Ax6, suppose that M,w |= B sig t. Then (w, B, t) ∈ Rsig. Let w
′ ∈ W
be any world with (w, A,w′) ∈ RJ. By SC3, we have (w
′, B, t) ∈ Rsig. Thus, M,w
′ |=
B sig t for all w′ ∈ W with (w, A,w′) ∈ RJ, which is equivalent to M,w |= A J (B sig t).
For axiom Ax7, suppose that M,w |= t֌ φ. Then M,w′ |= φ for all w′ ∈ W such
that (t,w′) ∈ R֌. Note that this condition is independent of w. This means that it holds
not just for w, but for every world w′′ ∈ W. In particular, it holds at every world w′′
such that (w, A,w′′) ∈ RJ. Thus, M,w
′′ |= t֌ φ for all w′′ ∈ W with (w, A,w′′) ∈ RJ,
which is equivalent to M,w |= A J (t֌ φ). 
We discuss some further axioms that are valid with respect to the semantics in
Section 8, but we make no attempt in this paper at completeness: our principal concern
is to develop a minimal set of axioms that support our main focus of reasoning about
contract signature processes.
Condition SC1 may present some difficulties when constructing models, since it
must be satisfied for the infinite set of formulas, and moreover refers to the semantics
of formulas. Because SC2 places a lower bound on R֌, the trivial solution where there
are no worlds w such that (φ,w) ∈ R֌ is not satisfactory. We now give a technical
construction that demonstrates that it is possible to start with a relation that expresses
the entailments of terms that are not formulas, and to extend this to a larger relation that
also expresses the entailments of formulas while satisfying condition SC1. This will
be useful when constructing a model to demonstrate invalidity below. (The reader may
prefer to skip the remainder of this section until this content is needed in Example 1.)
Define the entailment depth D of a term, inductively by
D(t) = 0 when t ∈ T \ F
D(p) = 1
D(¬φ) = D(φ)
D(φ1 ∧ φ2) = max(D(φ1),D(φ2))
D(A sig t) = 1
D(t֌ φ) = max(D(t),D(φ)) + 1
D(A J φ) = D(φ)
Note that terms that are not formulas have entailment depth 0, and formulas not con-
taining֌ have entailment depth 1. The formula p֌ p has depth 2, and (p֌ p)֌ p
has depth 3, since p֌ p is in F .
For relations R ⊆ T ×W and R′ ⊆ T ×W, define R ≡k R
′ when for all terms t with
D(t) ≤ k and w ∈ W we have (t,w) ∈ R iff (t,w) ∈ R′. Intuitively, R ≡0 R
′ when R
and R′ agree on the entailments of all terms that are not formulas, R ≡1 R
′ implies that,
additionally, R and R′ agree on the entailments of formulas that do not contain֌, and
R ≡2 R
′ implies that R and R′ agree on the entailments of formulas that contain֌, but
with a single depth of nesting, etc.
When M = 〈W,Rsig,R֌,RJ, pi〉 is a model and R ⊆ T ×W is a relation, we define
M(R) = 〈W,Rsig,R,RJ, pi〉 to be the result of substituting R for R֌.
Proposition 2. Let k ≥ 0 and let W be the set of worlds of a model M. Suppose that
R,R′ ⊆ T × W are relations such that R ≡k R
′. Then for all w ∈ W and formulas φ
with D(φ) ≤ k + 1 we have M(R),w |= φ iff M(R′),w |= φ.
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Proof. By induction on k. For the base case k = 0, assume R ≡0 R
′. Formulas φ with
depth D(φ) ≤ k + 1 = 1 do not contain the operator֌, and their semantics does not
depend on the relation R֌ in a model. A straightforward induction on the construction
of φ shows that for all w ∈ W, we have M(R),w |= φ iff M(R′),w |= φ. The details are
similar to the argument for the inductive case given below, so omitted.
For the inductive case, suppose by way of inductive hypothesis that R ≡k R
′ implies
that for all w ∈ W and formulas φ with D(φ) ≤ k + 1 we have M(R),w |= φ iff
M(R′),w |= φ. Suppose R ≡k+1 R
′. Then also R ≡k R
′. By induction, for all w ∈ W
and formulas φ with D(φ) ≤ k + 1 we have M(R),w |= φ iff M(R′),w |= φ. We prove
by a further induction on construction of φ that if D(φ) ≤ k + 2 then M(R),w |= φ iff
M(R′),w |= φ. We have the following cases:
• φ is an atomic proposition p ∈ Prop. Here M(R),w |= φ iff p ∈ pi(w) iff
M(R′),w |= φ.
• φ = ¬φ1. Here D(φ1) = D(φ) ≤ k + 2, so by induction, M(R),w |= φ iff not
M(R),w |= φ1 iff not M(R
′),w |= φ1 iff M(R
′),w |= φ.
• φ = φ1 ∧ φ2. Here D(φ1),D(φ) ≤ k + 2, so by induction, M(R),w |= φ iff
M(R),w |= φ1 and M(R),w |= φ2 iff M(R
′),w |= φ1 and M(R
′),w |= φ2 iff
M(R′),w |= φ.
• φ = A sig t. Here M(R),w |= φ iff (A, t) ∈ Rsig iff M(R
′),w |= φ.
• φ = t ֌ φ1. Here t may be a formula, and we have D(t),D(φ1) ≤ k + 1. Since
R ≡k+1 R
′ and D(t) ≤ k + 1 we have (t, u) ∈ R if (t, u) ∈ R′, for all u ∈ W.
Since D(φ1) ≤ k + 1 and R ≡k R
′, we have for all u ∈ W that M(R), u |= φ1
iff M(R′), u |= φ1. Thus M(R),w |= φ iff for all u ∈ W with (t, u) ∈ R we
have M(R), u |= φ1 iff for all u ∈ W with (t, u) ∈ R
′ we have M(R′), u |= φ1 iff
M(R′),w |= φ.
• φ = A J φ1. Here D(φ1) = D(φ) ≤ k + 2, and by induction, we have M(R),w
′ |=
φ1 iff M(R
′),w′ |= φ1. Hence M(R),w |= φ iff for all w
′ ∈ W we have (w, A,w′) ∈
RJ implies M(R),w
′ |= φ1 iff for all w
′ ∈ W we have (w, A,w′) ∈ RJ implies
M(R′),w′ |= φ1 iff M(R
′),w |= φ.

We now show that, given a model M = 〈W,Rsig,R֌,RJ, pi〉 and a relation R
0 ⊆
(T \ F ) × W, we can construct a relation Rω such that R0 ≡0 R
ω and M(Rω) satisfies
constraint SC1. We obtain Rω as the limit
⋃
i<ω R
i of a sequence of relations Ri ⊆
T ×W, defined inductively by
Ri+1 = Ri ∪ {(φ,w) | φ ∈ F , D(φ) = i + 1, M(Ri),w |= φ } .
Intuitively, the following result states that in M(Rω), the entailments of terms in T \ F
are exactly as in R0, and each formula entails just itself (plus anything that is valid in
M).
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Proposition 3. Let M = 〈W,Rsig,R֌,RJ, pi〉 be a model and and let R
0 ⊆ (T \F )×W
be a relation. Then R0 ≡0 R
ω and for all φ ∈ F , and w ∈ W, we have (φ,w) ∈ Rω iff
M(Rω),w |= φ.
Proof. It is immediate from the construction and the fact thatT \F = {t ∈ T | D(t) = 0}
that R0 ≡0 R
ω. Similarly, by construction, for all k > 0 we have Rk ≡k R
ω. Thus
Rk ≡k R
ω for all k ≥ 0. Thus, by Proposition 2 we have, for all k ≥ 0, that for all w ∈ W
and formulas φ with D(φ) ≤ k + 1 we have M(Rω),w |= φ iff M(Rk),w |= φ. Since for
φ ∈ F with D(φ) = k + 1, we have (φ,w) ∈ Rk+1 iff M(Rk),w |= φ, we have (φ,w) ∈ Rω
iff (φ,w) ∈ Rk+1 iff M(Rk),w |= φ iff M(Rω),w |= φ. 
Note that we obtain, in particular, that M(Rω) satisfies SC1.
4 Offer and Acceptance
One of the criteria in law for formation of a contract, and our primary focus in this
paper, is a ‘meeting of the minds’ concerning the terms of the contract. When the
terms of the contract between parties A and B are expressed by the formula φ, we may
represent this in our logic as (A J φ)∧ (B J φ), i.e., both A and B assent to φ. We take
this condition as a necessary outcome of any process used by the parties to enter into
contractual relations, and enquire into how processes for contract signature meet this
condition.
A common process whereby two parties A, B enter into a contract, accepted in law
as demonstrating the criterion of a “meeting of the minds”, is for A to make an offer
of the contract terms, and for B to accept. When implemented in a network setting, or
when the parties require evidence of the communication, we expect that both the offer
and acceptance will be signed.
We could attempt to express A’s offer of terms φ in the logic as A sig φ. By Ax2
and Ax4, this implies A J φ, so A assents to the terms φ.
From A’s point of view, this is too strong, since it has the risk that if B does not
accept the offer, A will remain bound to the terms φ. For example, if φ expresses ‘A
shall pay $US 100 to B and B shall transfer JPY 10,000 to A’, then A J φ implies that
A agrees (amongst other things) that A shall pay $US 100 to B. Party A would not want
to be held to account for this apparent promise if B does not accept the offer.
We can also conclude that A agrees that ‘B shall transfer JPY 10,000 to A’. In the
absence of a matching agreement by B, this is pragmatically somewhat peculiar. Party
A cannot, in general, make promises on B’s behalf, and unless A is in a position to
issue orders to B, a mere statement by A will not have the effect of placing B under any
obligation.
One might argue that since the entirety of A’s original statement, as signed, is un-
enforceable if B does not accept the offer, no part of it is enforceable. Indeed, contract
law would rule that no contract exists in this circumstance, so even if A has made a
promise, no legal action will be taken to enforce it. Still, notwithstanding the lack
of legal enforcement, A would want to avoid even the appearance of having a moral
obligation to B if the offer is not accepted.
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To avoid being committed to a promise if B does not accept, A could make their
offer conditional on B’s acceptance. This can be expressed in the logic as
A sig ((B sig φ) ⇒ φ) (1)
from which we obtain A J ((B sig φ) ⇒ φ), by Ax2 and Ax4, as before.
Now, when B accepts the offer with B sig φ (implying that B J φ), we deduce
using Ax6 that A J (B sig φ). From this and (1) we obtain using Ax5, that A J φ.
Thus, we have (A J φ) ∧ (B J φ), as required for a meeting of the minds.
Note that, at the time B signs, we already have A sig ((B sig φ) ⇒ φ), so B can be
assured that they will be able to hold A to the terms of the contract, and the risk to A in
signing φ directly does not apply to B.
It is worth noting that the argument works also with a slightly weaker form of the
content signed by A:
A sig ((B J φ)⇒ φ) (2)
From axioms Ax2 and Ax4 we have ⊢ (B sig φ) ⇒ B J φ. Applying rule R3, we get
⊢ A J ((B sig φ) ⇒ B J φ). Thus, once B sig φ we derive, as before, A J (B sig φ),
and can conclude that A J (B J φ), hence A J φ, using Ax2, Ax4, Ax5 and (2).
The above approaches deal with an offer and acceptance between two parties.
When the contract has a larger number of parties, some more care is required. Consider
a contract between three parties A, B and C, with the contract offered by A and B and
C accepting. One way to generalize from the two-party case would be with assertions
A sig (((B sig φ) ∧ (C sig φ))⇒ φ)
and B sig φ andC sig φ. However, this places both B andC in the situation of assenting
to φ when they are not guaranteed that the contract will in fact be formed. A better
alternative is to chain the conditional assertions signed, using
A sig (((B sig ((C sig φ) ⇒ φ)) ∧ (C sig φ))⇒ φ)
and and B sig ((C sig φ) ⇒ φ) and C sig φ. If A passes their signed message to A
and B and B then passes their signed message to C, then C can be assured their their
unconditional signature will validate the contract. Similarly, B can be assured that the
contract will be validated once C signs φ, so B’s conditional statement can be safely
made.
This idea can be generalized to n parties A1 . . . An, using formulas σ1, . . . , σn de-
fined by σn = An sig φ and σk = Ak sig ((
∧
i=k+1...n σi) ⇒ φ) for k = 1 . . .n − 1.
However, this approach is highly asymmetric, and requires, for safety, that the signed
messages be passed in a linear chain between the agents, with Ak+1 delaying their
signature until they have received the signed messages supporting σ1, . . . σk. In the
following section, we develop a more symmetric approach to contract signature.
5 Representing Counterpart Signatures
As an alternative to the offer and acceptance process, we now consider signature in
counterparts. Suppose that A and B, operating in a network setting, wish to sign an
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agreement whose meaning is captured by the formula φ. Moreover, unlike the offer-
acceptance approach, we would like the parties to sign the same, or at least symmetric
content.
An approach that does not work is for A and B to independently sign φ, i.e., A sig φ
and B sig φ, and then exchange these signatures. As noted above, we can then derive
A J φ and B J φ, so that both A and B agree to the terms of the contract as soon as
they sign. For both parties, this has the problem discussed above for the situation in
an offer-acceptance process in which the offeror sigs φ. We do not wish either party to
have agreed to the contract until the other also has agreed.
Mirroring the conditional account of offer and acceptance above, we could try to
make the version of the document that A signs conditional on B having signed, and vice
versa:
A sig ((B sig φ)⇒ φ) and B sig ((A sig φ) ⇒ φ) .
This will not work, since it still relies upon production of the direct signatures A sig φ
and B sig φ that we are trying to avoid. (Were we to add one or both of these, we would
have a redundant form of the previous offer and acceptance process.)
An alternative is to work with the weaker form of the conditions, as in
A sig ((B J φ)⇒ φ) and B sig ((A J φ) ⇒ φ) .
and hope that we can then derive A J φ and B J φ. Unfortunately, this also does not
work. By Ax4, we can derive
A J ((B J φ)⇒ φ) and B J ((A J φ)⇒ φ) .
However, this is too weak: these assertions have a model, satisfying our axioms, in
which neither A J φ nor B J φ.
Example 1. Suppose φ is the atomic proposition p, and let M = 〈W,Rsig,R֌,RJ, pi〉,
be a model withW = {w0,w1},
Rsig = {(w, A, (B J φ) ⇒ φ), (w, B, (A J φ)⇒ φ) | w ∈ W} ,
RJ = (W × {A, B} ×W) ,
and pi defined by pi(w0) = ∅ and pi(w1) = {p}. By the construction given in Section 3,
given the relation R0 = (T \F )×W, we may construct a relation R֌ = R
ω such that for
all formulas ψ, we have (ψ,w) ∈ R֌ iff M,w |= ψ. (Intuitively, the particular starting
point R0 we have selected here takes all terms that are not formulas to have only trivial,
i.e., valid, entailments.)
Note that for all worlds w, we have M,w |= A sig ((B J φ) ⇒ φ), and M,w |=
B sig ((A J φ) ⇒ φ). Moreover, for all w ∈ W we have M,w |= ¬(A J φ), since
(w, A,w0) ∈ RJ and M,w0, |= ¬φ. Similarly, M,w |= ¬(B J φ) for all w ∈ W. Hence,
all the assumptions of the proposed approach to counterpart signatures hold, but the
desired conclusion that M,w |= (A J φ) ∧ (B J φ) does not.
The model M has been constructed to satisfy constraint SC1. We show that it
also satisfies the constraints SC2-SC3, from which it follows using Proposition 1 and
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that it does not follow using the axioms and rules of inference that the conclusion
A J φ ∧ B J φ can be derived from the conditional signatures.
For constraint SC2, note that we have (w, X, t) ∈ Rsig iff either X = A and t = (B J
φ) ⇒ φ) or X = B and t = (A J φ) ⇒ φ). We need to show that in these cases, if
(w, X,w′) ∈ RJ then (t,w
′) ∈ R֌. In both cases t is a formula ψ in the form of an
implication whose antecedent is false at all worlds, and therefore ψ is true at all worlds.
Since we have (ψ, u) ∈ R֌ iff M, u |= ψ, we have that (ψ, u) ∈ R֌ for all worlds u in
W. It follows that SC2 holds.
For constraint SC3, note that the model satisfies (w, X, t) ∈ Rsig iff (w
′, X, t) ∈ Rsig
for all worlds w′ ∈ W. It follows that SC3 holds. 
As an alternative to relying on the statements made by the parties, our resolution of
the problem is to make the contract itself assert that it is valid if signed by both parties.
This requires allowing the contract to be self-referential. We develop the solution first
in the abstract, and propose a specific concrete syntax and semantics for self-reference
in the next section. For our abstract presentation, it suffices to capture self-reference by
means of an assumption about the entailment relation֌. Let c be a term representing
the contract itself, and let φ be a formula capturing the terms of the contract. We assume
that the following holds:
c֌ (((A sig c) ∧ (B sig c))⇒ φ) .
Intuitively, this says that the contract c entails that, once both A and B have signed it, φ
holds.
Suppose now that we have A sig c and B sig c. We show that it is now possible to
derive A J φ and B J φ, so that both A and B assent to φ. Note first that from A sig c
and the above assumption, we have
A J (((A sig c) ∧ (B sig c))⇒ φ)
by Ax4. Using Ax6 we also have that A J (A sig c) and A J (B sig c). By normality of
J, we deduce A J φ. A similar argument shows B J φ. This establishes the following:
Proposition 4. ⊢ ((c֌ (((A sig c)∧ (B sig c))⇒ φ))∧ (A sig c)∧ (B sig c))⇒ ((A J
φ) ∧ (B J φ))
The question now arises as to how we obtain a term c such that c֌ (((A sig c) ∧
(B sig c))⇒ φ). One possible answer is that we obtain this by fiat. The entailment rela-
tion֌ is application-specific, so we could introduce a ternary operator contract sic
(for “contract signable in counterparts”) and restrict to models such that the desired en-
tailment holds for the term c = contract sic(A, B, φ). For example, the legal system
governing the contract could establish the convention (e.g., by means of legislation or
regulatory ruling) that terms of this form have the desired entailment. While this has
the desired effect, it leaves the parties dependent on their external environment, and
it remains unresolved how they may proceed when operating in an environment that
does not have such a convention in place. In what follows, we show that by extending
the logic with a capability for self-reference, it becomes possible to identify a natural
formula c that necessarily satisfies the desired entailment.
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6 A syntax and semantics for self-reference
We now develop a specific syntax and semantics for self-referential terms. We ex-
tend the syntax given above. The language is now parameterized by a tuple Σ =
(A,Prop,O,Var) where all components are as above, but we add a set Var of vari-
ables, with generic element x, y, . . .. We extend the syntax of terms and formulas by
modifying the definition to the following:
t ::= x | A | on(t1, . . . , tn) | φ
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | t֌ φ | A sig t | A J φ | τx.φ
Here variables x have been added to the base case for terms t. There is also a new
binary operator τ which, when applied to a variable x and a formula φ, produces a
formula written τx.φ . Note that variables may not may appear in the base case of the
recursion for formulas — only propositions p in Prop may do so. The reason for this
restriction is to avoid paradox, as explained below. Since variables do appear in the
base case for terms t, they may thereby may appear in the formulas A sig t and t ֌ φ
within the subterms t.
Intuitively, τx.φ says that φ holds, where, in the context of φ, the variable x refers
to the formula τx.φ. Semantically, we think of the denotation of x as a term, i.e., as
pure syntax.
An occurrence of a variable x in a term t is said to be free if it is not inside any
subterm of t of the form τx.φ. Substitution of a term t for the free occurrences of
variable x in a term u, denoted u[x 7→ t], is defined by the usual recursion. In particular,
(τy(φ))[x 7→ t] = τy(φ) when y = x and (τy(φ))[x 7→ t] = τy(φ[x 7→ t]) otherwise. For
all other cases, the definition passes the substitution down to all direct subterms, e.g.,
(u֌ φ)[x 7→ t] = (u[x 7→ t])֌ (φ[x 7→ t]). We define a formula to be a sentence if it
has no free variables.
To extend the semantics, we restrict the application of the satisfaction relation to
sentences.1 (Note that every formula in the previous, more restricted syntax, is a sen-
tence, since it contains no variables, so this still encompasses the previous semantics.)
The semantics is extended by adding to the definition above the case
• M,w |= τx.φ if M,w |= φ[x 7→ τx.φ].
That is, τx.φ holds if φ holds, with the term τx.φ substituted for free ocurrences of x in
φ. In effect, this makes such occurrences equivalent to a reference to the formula τx.φ.
This semantics may appear to be viciously recursive, making the interpretation of
τx.φ depend on the semantics of a formula φ[x 7→ τx.φ] that may itself contain the
subformula τx.φ. However, we note that the syntactic restrictions adopted prevents
this from arising. Recall that the variable x may occur only in terms u appearing in
subformulas of φ of the forms A sig u for some agent A, or u ֌ ψ for some formula
ψ. The semantic clauses for these cases refer to the relations Rsig and R֌ in way that
treats u syntactically, without further decomposition that would result in a reinvocation
of the semantic clause for τx.φ. The recursion is therefore not vicious.
1At the cost of adding some complexity by adding an interpretation of variables on the left of the relation
we could extend this to all formulas, but we will not need this expressiveness for our purposes in this paper.
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More formally, define the semantic tree for a satisfaction expressionM,w |= φ to be
the tree with nodes labelled by expressions of the formM,w′ |= ψ, that has root labelled
M,w |= φ, and in which a node labelled by satisfaction expression M,w′ |= ψ has as
children a node for each satisfaction expression called recursively by the definition of
satisfaction (i.e., that occurs on the right hand side of the rule for M,w′ |= ψ). The
leaves of such a tree are the nodes labelled by a satisfaction expression that makes no
recursive calls, i.e., the cases for sentences p and A sig t. The following shows that the
recursion defining M,w |= φ is well-founded.
Proposition 5. For every sentence φ, model M and world w, the semantic tree for
M,w |= φ has finite height.
Proof. We write height(M,w |= φ) for the height (possibly infinite) of the semantic tree
for M,w |= φ. We note that since the set of worlds is potentially infinite, nodes may
have infinitely many children, so it does not necessarily hold that the semantic tree is
finite. We show the stronger proposition that for all models M,M′ with, respectively,
worlds w,w′, and sentences φ, we have height(M,w |= φ) = height(M′,w′ |= φ) is
finite. That is, the height of the semantic tree depends only on φ, and not on M or w.
Define the semantic τ-depth of a formula (not necessarily a sentence) φ, denoted
depth(φ), to be the depth of nesting of semantic occurrences of the operator τ in φ. This
excludes (syntactic) occurrences of τ in terms t in subformulas of φ of the forms A sig t
for some agent A, or t֌ ψ. More precisely, we define depth(φ) inductively, by
depth(p) = 0
depth(¬φ) = depth(φ)
depth(φ1 ∧ φ2) = max(depth(φ1), depth(φ2))
depth(A sig t) = 0
depth(t֌ φ) = depth(φ)
depth(A J φ) = depth(φ)
depth(τx(φ)) = depth(φ) + 1
We claim that for all formulas φ and terms t, we have depth(φ[x 7→ t]) = depth(φ).
Intuitively, this is because in formulas φ, the variable x may occur only in syntactic
positions, where it does not contribute to the depth. The proof is by induction on the
construction of φ. The cases for atomic propositions p and formulas A sig u are trivial,
and the cases for φ of the form ¬ψ, ψ1 ∧ψ2 t֌ ψ and A J ψ are straightforward, e.g..
depth((A J ψ)[x 7→ t]) = depth(A J (ψ[x 7→ t])
= depth(ψ[x 7→ t])
= depth(ψ) (by induction)
= depth(A J ψ) .
For φ = τy(ψ), we have two cases. If x = y, then
depth(φ[x 7→ t]) = depth((τy(ψ))[x 7→ t])
= depth(τy(ψ))
= depth(φ) .
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If x , y, then
depth(φ[x 7→ t]) = depth((τy(ψ))[x 7→ t])
= depth((τy(ψ[x 7→ t]))
= depth(ψ[x 7→ t]) + 1
= depth(ψ) + 1 (by induction)
= depth(τy(ψ))
= depth(φ)
as required.
We can now prove the (generalized version of) the result. For a formula φ let |φ|
be the size of φ, i.e, the number of symbols in φ. We proceed by induction using the
well-founded order on formulas induced by the mapping k : φ 7→ (depth(φ), |φ|) from
the lexicographic order on pairs of natural numbers, which is well-founded.
Clearly, for all M,w, we have height(M,w |= p) = 0 and height(M,w |= A sig t) = 0
since these nodes have no children.
For ¬φ, note that k(¬φ) = (depth(¬φ), |¬φ|) = (depth(φ), |¬φ|) > ((depth(φ), |φ|) =
k(φ). Thus, we have height(M,w |= ¬φ) = height(M,w |= φ) + 1 which is finite and
independent of M,w by induction.
Similarly, for φ1 ∧ φ2 we have
k(φ1 ∧ φ2) = (depth(φ1 ∧ φ2), |φ1 ∧ φ2|)
= (max(depth(φ1), depth(φ2)), |φ1 ∧ φ2|)
> (depth(φi), |φi|)
= k(φi)
for each i = 1, 2. By induction, for each i = 1, 2, we have height(M′,w′ |= φi) is
finite and independent of M′,w′. Hence height(M,w |= φ1 ∧ φ2) = max(height(M,w |=
φ1), height(M,w |= φ2)) + 1 is also finite and independent of M,w.
For nodes labelled M,w |= t ֌ φ we have a child M,w′ |= φ for each world w′ of
M such that (t,w′) ∈ R֌. Note
k(t֌ φ) = (depth(t֌ φ), |t֌ φ|)
= (depth(φ), |t֌ φ|)
> (depth(φ), |φ|)
= k(φ) .
By induction, we have that height(M,w′ |= φ) is independent of M,w′ and finite. Hence
we have that height(M,w |= t֌ φ) = height(M,w |= φ) + 1 is also finite and indepen-
dent of M,w. The argument for M,w |= A J φ is similar.
For nodes labelled M,w |= τx(φ), we have one child, labelled M,w |= φ[x 7→
τx(φ)], so height(M,w |= τx(φ)) = height(M,w |= φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]) + 1. Using the fact,
proved above, that depth(φ[x 7→ t]) = depth(φ) for all terms t, we have in particular
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that depth(φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]) = depth(φ). Hence
k(τx(φ)) = (depth(τx(φ)), |τx(φ)|)
= (depth(φ) + 1, |τx(φ)|)
= (depth(φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]) + 1, |τx(φ)|)
> (depth(φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]), |φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]|)
= depth(φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]) .
Hence, by induction, we have that height(M,w |= φ[x 7→ τx(φ)]) is finite and indepen-
dent of M,w. It follows that height(M,w |= τx(φ)) is also finite and independent of
M,w, as required. 
This result critically uses the fact that variables x appear only in syntactic positions
in formulas. A serious problem for the semantics would arise if we were to allow x
to occur more generally. For example, τx.¬x is essentially the famous “Liar Paradox”
[BGR19], since it effectively states “This formula is false”. Applying the above se-
mantics would yield M,w |= τx.¬x iff M,w |= ¬(τx.¬x) iff not M,w |= τx.¬x, making
the semantics itself inconsistent!
In an effort to give the most general possible solution to the Liar, for languages
containing a truth predicate, a variety of approaches have been proposed, including
hierarchies of languages and meta-languages [Tar56], fixed point semantics [Kri75], or
use of non-standard set theories [BE87]. The scope of these approaches is significantly
beyond our needs, since our logic has no truth operator. One could attempt to follow
the µ-calculus [Koz83] and require that occurrences of x inside φ must be in positive
position for τx.φ to be well-formed. We have not pursued such approaches here because
we deliberately wish to treat x semantically as a term, i.e., a piece of syntax, rather than
as a property, as in the µ-calculus.
Having introduced the new self-reference construct with the above semantics, we
get a new axiom for the logic:
Ax8 (τx.φ) ⇔ φ[x 7→ (τx.φ)]
Proposition 6. Ax8 is valid.
Proof. Direct from the semantics. 
7 Application of self-reference to counterpart signatures
In Section 5, we already gave the structure of the argument that individually signed
copies of a contract c imply the agents’ assent to the logical content φ of the contract.
That argument assumed that c satisfies the formula c֌ (((A sig c) ∧ (B sig c)) ⇒ φ).
We now show that the syntax and semantics for self-reference developed above enables
us to display a particular contract c for which this formula is indeed a validity of the
logic. For the remainder of this section, let c be the formula
τx.(((A sig x) ∧ (B sig x)) ⇒ φ) .
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Intuitively, this expresses “This contract may be signed in counterparts” as “This for-
mula, if signed by both A and B, implies that φ holds” where φ expresses the logical
content of the contract.
Proposition 7. ⊢ c֌ (((A sig c) ∧ (B sig c)) ⇒ φ).
Proof. We have the following instance of axiom Ax8:
c⇔ (((A sig c) ∧ (B sig c))⇒ φ) .
By Ax2, we have that c֌ c. Hence, using Ax3, and R1, we derive c֌ (((A sig c) ∧
(B sig c))⇒ φ). 
It follows using the argument of Section 5 that we can use the particular formula c
to implement signature by counterpart of a contract with logical content φ.
Proposition 8. ⊢ ((A sig c) ∧ (B sig c))⇒ ((A J φ) ∧ (B J φ)).
Thus, we have the concrete self-referential formula c as one example that supports
signature in counterparts in our logic. Other examples are easily generated. For exam-
ple, it is clear that for contracts involving a larger number of parties A1, . . . , An, for the
formula m defined as
τx.


∧
i=1...n
Ai sig x
⇒ φ

we have
⊢

∧
i=1...n
Ai sig m
⇒

∧
i=1...n
Ai J φ
 .
8 Common Assent
We now consider the intuitive interpretation of our operators and present some addi-
tional consequences of the semantics that follow from condition SC3. As we have
noted, this condition underpins axiom Ax6, which states that
(B sig t) ⇒ A J (B sig t)
for all agents A, B.
Whether this axiom is desirable is application dependent, and we do not propose
that the semantics considered in the present paper is adequate for all applications. It is
part of our intended interpretation of B sig t that agent B has placed their non-repudiable
and publicly verifiable (cryptographic) signature on the content t. This means that, pre-
sented with the signed content, no agent can reasonably dispute that B sig t. However,
it might be objected that B sig t does not imply that agent A knows that B has signed t,
since A may not have seen the signed content. We have not modeled knowledge in the
logic, but if what A assents to is based on A’s incomplete view of the world, then there
may well be true statements concerning what other agents have in fact signed about
which A is agnostic. In this event, validity of axiom Ax6 would be stronger than is
desirable.
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A stronger argument for the axiom can be made on the assumption that all signed
statements are available to all agents. The intuitive motivation given earlier in the
paper, that the semantics can be understood as modeling a scenario where all the cryp-
tographic evidence is available, e.g., as in a court proceeding, supports this assumption.
Another scenario that supports the axiom is a setting where a central trusted agent,
such as a law firm or official registry, collects and stores all signed statements, and
provides any such evidence to an agent upon request. Indeed, signature of contracts in
counterparts often makes use of law firms for this purpose (see the discussion section
below). With this assumption, a reading of A J φ as “agent A would say φ once all the
evidence has been obtained” would support axiom Ax6.
A more secure way to realize such a scenario, particularly if there are questions
about the trustworthiness or reliability of a third party, would be to eliminate use of
a third party by using a blockchain to record the signed statements. (Blockchains
use a variety of byzantine consensus protocols to implement an immutable ledger
[Nak08, ACC+17].) In such an application A sig t could be taken to have the semantics
that not only has A cryptographically signed t, but that the signed copy of t has been
recorded on the blockchain. Similarly A J φ can be interpreted as meaning that cryp-
tographic evidence entailing that A assented to φ is present on the blockchain.2 In such
an interpretation, there is a strong case for the validity of axiom Ax6, since a secure
public record is available to all agents.
Assuming axiom Ax6, we can derive some further conclusions. WhenG is a group
(set) of agents, write G J φ for the conjunction
∧
A∈G A J φ, and inductively define
G Jk φ, where k ≥ 1 is a natural number, by G J1 φ = G J φ and G Jk+1 φ = G J
(G Jk φ). Define the semantics of G Jω φ by
• M,w |= G Jω φ if M,w |= G Jk φ for all natural numbers k ≥ 1.
Intuitively, G Jω φ states that the group G is in mutual agreement concerning φ.
Not only does everyone in the group agree to φ (sinceG J φ), but everyone agrees that
everyone agrees, i.e., G J (G J φ), and they furthermore agree that everyone agrees
that everyone agrees, i.e., G J3 φ, and so on. This notion is very similar to the well-
know notion of common knowledge from the literature on epistemic logic [FHMV95]
with the exception that we do not have (G J φ) ⇒ φ valid. As the following result
shows, it is a normal operator satisfying an induction condition.
Proposition 9. The operator G Jω φ satisfies the following for all models M:
1. if M |= φ then M |= G Jω φ,
2. M |= ((G Jω φ) ∧G Jω (φ⇒ ψ))⇒ G Jω ψ,
3. if M |= φ⇒ G J (φ ∧ ψ) then M |= φ⇒ G Jω ψ,
4. M |= G Jω φ⇔ G J (φ ∧G Jω φ).
2There are subtleties about finality and the stability of the record that depend on the details of the con-
sensus protocol in use by the blockchain. Some blockchains have the property that facts may be unstable,
though only with negligible probability. For our purposes here we treat this as equivalent to actual stability
for practical purposes.
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Proof. Properties (1) and (2) follow straightforwardly by induction from normality of
the operator A J for all agents A.
For (3), suppose M |= φ ⇒ G J (φ ∧ ψ) . We show by induction on k that
M |= φ ⇒ G Jk (φ ∧ ψ) for all k ≥ 1. This yields (3) by using (2). The base case of
k = 1 is simply a restatement of the assumption. Assume M |= φ⇒ G Jk (φ ∧ ψ). By
normality of A J, we obtain M |= (A J φ) ⇒ A J (G Jk (φ ∧ ψ)) for all A ∈ G, and
hence M |= (G J φ) ⇒ G J (G Jk (φ ∧ ψ)). Similarly, by normality, we obtain from
the original assumption that M |= φ⇒ G J φ. Thus M |= φ⇒ G Jk+1 (φ ∧ ψ).
For (4), note that M,w |= G Jω φ implies for all k ≥ 1 that M,w |= G Jk+1 φ,
hence M,w |= G J (G Jk φ), as well as M,w |= G J φ. Thus, for all A ∈ G and
(w, A,w′) ∈ RJ and k ≥ 1, we have M,w
′ |= φ ∧ G Jk φ. We obtain from this that
M,w |= G J (φ ∧ G Jω φ). Conversely, if M,w |= G J (φ ∧ G Jω φ), we have
M,w |= G J φ and M,w |= G J (G Jk φ), for all k ≥ 1, i.e., M,w |= G Jk φ, for all
k ≥ 2. Thus, M,w |= G Jω φ. 
This result justifies the following axiom and rules of inference for G Jω φ:
Ax9 (G Jω φ)⇔ G J (φ ∧G Jω ψ)
R4 ⊢ φ implies ⊢ G Jω φ.
R5 ⊢ φ⇒ G J (φ ∧ ψ) implies ⊢ φ⇒ G Jω ψ.
We note that we derive from the above that
⊢ (G Jω φ) ∧G Jω (φ⇒ ψ)) ⇒ G Jω ψ
so that the operatorG Jω is normal.
Using these axioms and rules, we can derive a stronger statement about the effect
of signing a contract. Let c be the contract from Section 7. The conclusion of our
characterization of signature in counterparts was that
⊢ (A sig c ∧ B sig c)⇒ {A, B} J φ
where φ expressess the terms of the contract.
We derive using axiom Ax6 that
⊢ (A sig c ∧ B sig c)⇒ {A, B} J (A sig c ∧ B sig c ∧ φ) .
Using R4, we get that
⊢ (A sig c ∧ B sig c)⇒ {A, B} Jω φ .
That is, it follows from the fact that both A and B have signed the contract not just
that {A, B} J φ (both assent to the terms of the contract), but that {A, B} Jω φ, i.e., the
parties are in mutual agreement about the content of the contract: they are also agreed
that they are agreed, they agree that that they agree that they agree, etc. Certainly this
is a desirable conclusion - problems could arise if were to accept that it is possible that
the parties have agreed to the contract but they are in disagreement about whether they
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have agreed - one could envisage one of the agents litigating on the question of whether
a valid contract has in fact been formed, in order to escape the contract. The desirability
of mutual agreement may in fact underlie the historical process of gathering all parties
in a single location for a signature ceremony, since such a setting, with all parties
observing each other signing the contract, establishes common knowledge concerning
the parties agreement to the contract.
Indeed, we can draw a further conclusion. Using axiom Ax6 we can obtain that
⊢ (A sig c ∧ B sig c)⇒ H J (A sig c ∧ B sig c)
for every group H of agents. Using R4, we get that
⊢ (A sig c ∧ B sig c) ⇒ H Jω (A sig c ∧ B sig c)
and consequently that
⊢ (A sig c ∧ B sig c) ⇒ H Jω ({A, B} Jω φ) .
That is, if A and B have signed, then not just they, but in fact all of society is in mutual
agreement that A and B have assented to the terms of the contract. This again could
be considered desirable, from the point of view of societal enforcement of contracts.
Under an interpretation of A sig c as implying that the signature has been logged on a
public blockchain, this conclusion is consistent with the conception of the blockchain
as representing the consensus of all participating agents.
On the other hand, it is reasonable that agents might be entitled to privacy con-
cerning their contracts unless these come into dispute, which would argue against the
reasonableness of this conclusion. However, if we interpret A J φ conditionally, as
asserting that A would agree to φ were A to be be presented with all the relevant (cryp-
tographic) signature evidence in existence, then we do not have that A J φ implies A
knows that A J φ, and the conclusion is more reasonable. We expect this intuition
could be formalized by adding conditional, temporal and/or epistemic expressiveness
to the framework, but leave this for future work.
We remark that a similar argument to the above yields from axiom Ax7 that for all
groups H we have
(t֌ φ)⇒ H Jω (t֌ φ)
Intuitively, this states that all agents in H mutually agree to the entailments of a term t.
This is exactly as we would expect, on the assumption that all agents “speak the same
language” which moreover is common knowledge.
9 Discussion
We have argued in this paper for some particular syntactical interpretations of the mean-
ing of signing a contract in various processes. We have given natural axioms for the
logical operators used, and demonstrated that these axioms justify reasoning steps that
show that these processes satisfy a criterion of ‘meeting of the minds’. Our formal
semantics in this paper has been constructed as a simple semantics that validates the
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axioms. We have focussed exclusively on reasoning about contract signatures. A fuller
treatment of the meaning of the logical content of contracts requires a richer language
with additional expressiveness covering time, actions, and deontic notions. This will
require a correspondingly richer semantics than that of the present paper. (There exist
works on logical representation of contracts that attempt to support such a richer ex-
pressiveness, e.g, [KW05, Das99], but the signature process does not appear to have
been considered.)
We note that questions about the right semantics do not affect the main conclusions
of the paper in Section 5 and Section 7. We have established these conclusions proof
theoretically, using only the minimal set of rules and axioms in Section 2 and Section 6,
so these conclusions should be acceptable to anyone who accepts the correctness of
these rules and axioms.
We have not attempted to prove a completeness result for our logic, but have merely
developed a semantics that validates the axioms we have chosen to work with. This
suffices to show that the logic is consistent, and was useful in Section 5 to show that a
particular entailment does not hold. We do not expect that there are inherent difficulties
in proving a completeness result, but defer this to future work on a richer logic.
For some applications, e.g., asynchronous message passing contexts where agents
do not have access to a common source of truth about what has been signed, the con-
clusions of Section 8 may be considered to be too strong, and it may be desirable to
move to a weaker semantics that drops semantic condition SC3 and the corresponding
axiom Ax6. In such settings, it would be beneficial to introduce an operator that ex-
presses that an agent “has” a message. We leave for future work the question of what,
from the point of view of intuitive acceptability and the needs of applications, are the
appropriate axioms beyond the ones we have used, as well the question of what more
liberal semantics supports the required axioms.
The operator A J φ is similar to the operator A says φ from access control and
authentication logics, which have been surveyed by Abadi [Aba08]. However, these
logics generally do not have our distinction (critical to keeping our semantics of self-
reference simple) between A J φ and A sig φ, where in the latter φ is treated as a
syntactic term rather than as a proposition. (Exceptions include [HvdM01], and, in
the different context of logics for electronic commerce messaging, a body of work by
Kimbrough [KW05] and others that uses “disquotation” of a syntactic representation
of messages, that can be understood as following a “syntactic substitution” treatment
of modalities.)
The need for an axiom
B says φ⇒ A says (B says φ)
similar to Ax6 is generally accepted in access control and authentication logics. Indeed
some logics in this class accept the much stronger axiom
φ⇒ A says φ
although the basis of the logic in this case is generally taken to be intuitionistic, to
avoid some undesirable consequences in a classical setting. The motivation for such
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axioms in the context of access control logic is to obtain validities such as
(A says ((B says φ) ⇒ φ)) ∧ (B says φ)⇒ A says φ
which enables A to delegate to B the ability to “speak for” A on φ, by A says ((B says φ)⇒
φ). We note that this motivation is very similar to our account of offer and acceptance
in Section 4.
There exists a body of work in the cryptography literature on “contract signing
protocols” or “fair exchange protocols” [PVG03, KMZ02]. A protocol is said to be
fair if it ensures that the parties receive fully signed copies of the contract atomically,
i.e., neither party has a fully signed copy until it is guaranteed that the other will also
obtain a copy. Some protocols also aim to be abuse-free [GJM99], in the sense that
neither party is ever in a position where they have not yet assented to the contract,
but are able to prove to a third party that they unilaterally have the ability to produce
a fully signed copy (enforcing assent of the other party). Some general impossibility
theorems imply that it is often not possible to achieve fairness without use of a trusted
third party [EY80], but protocols may attempt to minimize the use of this third party
in various ways, e.g., using them as a fallback in case one party attempts to cheat
the other [ASW00]. Some recent work has sought to use blockchain as the basis for
fair exchange protocols, effectively decentralizing the trusted third party. A general
construction for fair computation in the setting of Bitcoin is given in [BK14]. More
specific protocols focussed on contract signing are developed in [FHI19, WLL+19,
ZZYX20]. Some of these rely on a redefinition of signature that meets one of our
proposed interpretations of A sig t, e.g., the protocol in [FHI19] does not consider a
message to be signed until it has been registered on the blockchain.
The fair exchange problem is orthogonal to the issues we have addressed in the
present paper. We are concerned with the semantics of the individually signed mes-
sages, and, in effect, reason in the final state of a fair exchange, where these messages
have been successfully exchanged. We do not address the question of abuse-freedom:
even if it does not constitute assent to the contract, agent A’s signature on the self-
referential formula c we have developed could very well be sufficient evidence for a
third party of A’s willingness to engage in the contract. Moreover, we have assumed it
is sufficient for validity of the contract simply that A sig c and B sig c, without consider-
ing the issue of who possesses the cryptographic evidence. In Section 8 we argued that
the use of a trusted third party or blockchain best justifies some aspects of our seman-
tics for J. A potential topic for future research is the interaction between our semantic
viewpoint on messages and fair exchange protocols: it may be possible to develop a
declarative understanding of the intermediate messages in these protocols, in the spirit
of attempts to give a declarative meaning to messages in cryptographic protocols such
as authentication protocols [BAN90]. A richer modeling incorporating temporal and
epistemic dimensions would be appropriate for such a project, and, depending on the
nature of message passing environment and blockchain protocol, the appropriate notion
of common knowledge may well be a more complex form of fixed point [HP17].
In the present paper, we have been primarily concerned with developing a logical
understanding of processes for contract signature as it relates to a meeting of the minds.
Beyond this issue, there are several concerns relating to the signature process that af-
fect the legal standing of the contract. Contracts often need to be not just signed but
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also given official standing as a contract by being ‘sealed’ (a term that derives from the
historical use of wax seals for this purpose - nowadays a signature may serve the same
purpose). Legislation affecting particular types of contracts may place additional re-
quirements, e.g., use of witnesses, and registration of the contract with a registrar, who
may impose particular physical forms on the contract, such as original signed copies or
specific types and sizes of paper.
A report [AAH+16] by a group of major law firms has developed general principles
and three distinct protocols for remote signing of financial documents. Generally, these
require signers to print and sign a paper copy of the contract and/or signature page, but
allows scanned copies of these to be returned. All the protocols assume a coordinating
legal law firm, so they use a centralized trusted third party. Statements made by the sig-
natories in the emails by which the scanned copies are delivered address the questions
of sealing and validity date of the contract. The report does not go into the general
legal principles or security requirements underlying the design of these protocols, or
elucidate how the protocols meet the requirements for the particular types of contract
for which they are recommended. It may be interesting to pursue these questions in
future work, using a formal methodology similar to that of the present paper.
Our work in this paper has been motivated by a view of future work on smart legal
contracts in which parties enter into relationships recognized by the legal system, with
(partial) enforcement of terms through code on the blockchain. Declarative representa-
tions of the contract terms, in this view, act as formal specifications that bridge between
legal contracts and the on-chain code. Present smart contract platforms are generally
built for a Smart Contract Absolutist or “Code is Law” view that does not recognize
legal jurisdiction, and uses imperative code rather than declarative representations of
the relationships enforced between the parties.
While platforms such as Ethereum [Eth] use digitally signed messages, agreement
to smart contract terms is implicit. In effect, an offeror makes an offer by signing a
transaction that registers code on to the blockchain. Other parties accept to engage on
the terms enforced by this code not by means of messages that explicitly agree to these
terms, but simply by sending a signed transaction that calls a function of the on-chain
code. Typically this “accepting” transaction also transfers some asset (cryptocurrency
or token) from control of the acceptor to the control of the on-chain code. It is this grant
of control rather than an explicit agreement that commits the acceptor to the terms of
the contract.
One step closer to our view is Digital Asset’s DAML smart contract language
[DAM]. This language was developed to support smart contracts that do carry legal
recognition, and are required to be legally compliant, for applications such as equity
rights representations on the digital ledger based clearance and settlement system un-
der development for the Australian Stock Exchange [ASX]. Like Ethereum contracts,
DAML contracts are code, but it is intended that this code may represent rights and
obligations enforced either on-chain or in the real world. (Off-chain obligations are
expressed in on-chain code simply as text fields.) Each DAML smart contract has “sig-
natories”, a set of parties. All signatories need to authorize a DAML contract before
it can be can be registered on the blockchain. The authorizers of an action (a function
call on a smart contract) are the agent(s) calling the action and the signatories of the
contract on which it is called. To create a contract, all its signatories must be in the
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set of authorizers of the creation action. This view enables a two-party offer and ac-
ceptance process in which the offeror first lodges on-chain an offer contract for which
it is the sole signatory, on which the acceptor calls an acceptance function that has
the effect of creating the actual two-party contract. For n-party contracts, the DAML
manual recommends a process using a sequence of on-chain contracts, starting with an
initial contract with a single signatory, and adding the remaining signatories one-by-
one through function calls that create the next contract in the chain. The call made by
the final party creates the intended contract on chain, with all n parties as signatories.
This process is structured somewhat like the linear n-party offer-acceptance process
discussed in Section 4, but with the intended terms represented implicitly in the code.
A disadvantage of imperative code-based smart contracts on a Smart Contract Ab-
solutist view is that the possible behaviors of code may be difficult to understand,
even for its original developers. Divergences from the expected behaviors sometimes
have serious consequences, e.g., in case of malicious attacks exploiting design flaws
[Pop16], and leave the parties without legal recourse.
Riccardian Contracts [Gri04] have been proposed as approach dealing with com-
prehensibility and the lack of legal recourse: the key idea is that parties to a contract
digitally sign content that is expressed in a restricted form that can be interpreted both
as a legal contract and as code. Due to this dual purpose, code in these contracts typ-
ically has a significantly more limited expressive power than the “Turing-complete”
smart contracts on platforms like Ethereum. In some incarnations [Ope15], Riccardian
contracts are a set of attribute-value pairs. The attributes and values may be natural
language words for readability, but their interpretation is external to the representation.
(Our logical approach would represent such a data object as a term, and represent its
meaning using the entailment relation.) A Riccardian contract may also express (in
natural language) the legal agreement between the parties as to how code will be inter-
preted by them from a legal perspective. In this regard the contract is similar to an EDI
Trading Partner Agreement [BP91].
Riccardian contracts are evidently the most closely compatible of the above forms
of smart contract with the view of contract signature proposed in the present paper,
but it may be possible to use an extension of the logic to give an interpretation of the
other approaches, by means of an appropriate definition of the entailments of transac-
tion messages. We leave for future work the further development of the logic to enable
richer representations of contract terms, and the investigation of the relationships be-
tween the resulting representation and the above forms of smart contracts.
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